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Abstract 
A key feature of  the general logic of paradigms or research programs as applied to the history 
of economic thought, is the acceptance of  the  fundamental  change in the ways of 
formulating, and  analyzing  facts and concepts. One can discern an  example of the above  
fundamental change  in a critical comparison of  a particular aspect of the work of the 
classical  economist J. Rae and of one  of  the first adherents of  the  marginalist  school,  C. 
Menger. This  aspect  is  the idea of orders.  In particular, both economists had as a basis a 
similar view  that objects can be classified in terms of orders. However, they developed a 
completely  different  theory which was driven  by their respective conceptual framework. 
The purpose of this paper  is  to  illustrate  by using the case of  Rae   and Menger, how the  
same  idea  can lead  to  completely  different  approaches depending  on the conceptual  
framework 
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I. Introduction 
 
Many works  have pointed out the shift in   conceptual  framework that took place with the 
marginalist revolution. The emergence of marginalism represented  a  theoretical shift of 
major importance with two main characteristics: The change of emphasis to questions of  
allocation and a movement away from  a supply-based explanation of  value and prices to a  
demand-based explanation. A number of historians of economics  have  characterized  this  
change  as an example of scientific revolution in the sense  of modern philosophies of science 
like  Kuhn’s and Lakatos’ (e.g. Coats,1969; Bronfenbrenner,1971;Blaug,1976; Deane, 
1978).1 If  one accepts  the general logic of paradigms or research programs, one is ready to 
accept the  fundamental  change in the ways of formulating, and  analyzing  facts and 
concepts and in general, the  change in conceptual framework.  
 
One can discern an  example of the above  fundamental change  in a critical comparison of  a 
particular aspect of the work of the classical  economist J. Rae and of one  of  the first 
adherents of  the  marginalist  school,  C. Menger. This  aspect  is  the idea of orders.  In 
particular, both economists had as a basis a similar view  that objects can be classified in 
terms of orders. However, they developed a completely  different  theory which was driven  
by their respective conceptual framework.  
 
Thus the purpose of this paper  is  to  illustrate  by using the case of  Rae   and Menger, how 
the  same  idea  can lead  to  completely  different  approaches depending  on the conceptual  
framework.  Thus  the paper  starts with a brief section  on  Rae  and Menger  in historical 
perspective. The  next section  discusses and compares  the concept of orders of  instruments  
which can be  found  in   Rae with  the orders  of  goods which is  in  Menger’s work. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 It has to be noted though that not all historians of economics accept the idea of scientific revolutions 
especially with reference to the classical and the marginalist schools (e.g. Hollander, 1979) 
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II. Rae and  Menger  in  Historical perspective 
 
Rae (1796-1872) can  classified as belonging  to the classical school. Emerging from the 
Universities of Aberdeen and   Edinburgh, he  published one  main work in  Boston. This 
work   was entitled ”The Statement of Some New Principles  on the Subject of Political 
Economy Exposing the Fallacies of the System of Free Trade and of Some other  Doctrines 
Maintained in  the ‘Wealth of Nations’”. The book was published in 1834 and as the title 
indicates it was targeted against some  of  A. Smith’s views. More specifically, he attacked 
the role of the free-trade and the anti-state views of Smith  (Schumpeter, 1954,pp.468-469 
and Roll,1973,p.418). Apart from his attack on  Smith, Rae developed a thorough  theory of 
capital which as we shall see, had as a starting point the idea of  orders of  instruments.   
 
Although J.S. Mill had quoted the book,  it did not make considerable impact among his 
contemporaries. Some of his ideas re-surface almost 50 years later, in Böhm-Bawerk’s theory 
of capital. Initially, he learned of Rae’s ideas through  Mill, but later he cited from Rae’s book 
itself (see Mixter, 1897,1902). After  a few years, there was a new rearranged edition of his 
book by C. Mixter under the title “Sociological Theory of Capital”,  through  which Rae’s 
ideas started to be re-introduced in the history of  economic thought. It has to be pointed out 
though, that for the majority of historians, he still remains one of  the lesser figures.  
 
 
On the other hand,  Menger (1840-1921) is thought to be a member of the marginalist trinity, 
although  an increasing number of historians of economic thought have promoted the view 
that Menger cannot be categorized in the same school as Jevons and Walras (see for instance 
Jaffe,1976; Loasby,1976; Alter, 1982,1990; Staley,1989).  Menger’s ideas were much more 
influential in terms  of subsequent influence than Rae.  He was the founder  of the Austrian 
school  which can  still  be  discerned as  one of the non-orthodox  approaches. Menger, for 
instance influenced the economic thought of E. von Böhm-Bawerk and through him Hayek. 
(Backhouse,1985,p.93). The use of  the concept of  margin in  his  economic analysis, his 
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subjective  theory  of value and his emphasis  upon  competitive  markets are the main 
elements  which  justify  his position  in the   development  of marginalist thought  
(Drakopoulos, 1991,p.74). The main body of his  work is to   be found in his first book which 
has  been translated to English as  Principles of Economics (1871). His well known 
methodological anti-historicist position can be found in his  second book  translated as 
“Problems of Economics and  Sociology” (1883).  
 
III. Wants, Instruments   and Goods 
 
For Rae, human  wants  is   the basic concept. “The end  [of Man] is a supply for  future 
wants.” (Rae,1834,p.83). On  this concept he  builds the  notion of instrument which is central 
in his analysis.  
 
“The term instrument is, in general, properly enough employed, to denote any means for 
the attainment of some end” (Rae,1834,p.86). 
 
Combining the above with  his  definition of  end, it is clear,  that instruments are the means 
for the attainment of human wants. The more detailed definition that Rae gives  is the 
following: 
 
“In general then, all the changes which man makes, in the form of arrangements of the  
parts of material objects, for the purpose of supplying his future wants, and which derive 
their power of doing this from his knowledge of the  course of events, and the changes 
which his labor, guided by his reason, is hence enabled to  make in the issue of these 
events,  may be  termed instruments” (Rae,1834,p.87). 
 
Almost forty years later, Menger’s  definition of  the good is conducted in very similar terms. 
According to Menger, a thing can become a good when the four following conditions are 
present: 
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“ A human need, 2) Such properties as render the thing capable of being brought into a 
causal connection with the satisfaction of this need 3) Human knowledge of this casual 
connection,  4) Command of the thing sufficient to  direct it to the  satisfaction of the 
need”(Menger,1950, p.52). 
 
It  is clear that the two definitions are  extremely similar. 
 
Rae  goes on to  give a   number of  examples of  instruments.  For  him,  a  field and  the 
wheat grown on  this   field  are instruments. The want that the wheat satisfies is  nourishment   
(Rae, 1834,p.88). Further examples are  the  flour,  all  tools and  machines,  houses, ships, 
cattle,  gardens,  stores  (Rae, 1834,pp.88-89).  
 
Menger  also   gives examples  of   goods  which are more or less  similar  to  the ones we 
saw in  Rae  (Menger,  1950,p.57). Thus  up to this point,  one can observe that both  authors 
have extremely  similar ideas. 
 
Rae proceeds to list the common points to   all instruments: 
 
1) They are all either directly formed   by   human labor, or  indirectly [through the use of 
other instruments] 
2) All instruments...either  produce,  or contribute to  the production, of events supplying 
some of our wants. Their power  to  produce such  events,  or the amount of them that they 
do  produce, may be  termed their capacity     
3) Between the formation and exhaustion  of instruments a space of  time  intervenes.  
(Rae, 1834,pp.91-93) 
 
The first point gives the  first hint  for  a classical  theory of value. Rae’s theory of value is 
not entirely clear as Böhm-Bawerk had also pointed out (Böhm-Bawerk 1959, p. 237). 
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However, one can argue that he held a classical theory in a wider sense (see Ahmad, 1996, p.7 
and Maneschi, 1996). As far as  the second point is concerned,  Rae  explicitly states that the 
measure  with  which  capacities are measured is labour. Again  this  reinforces  the  move 
towards a classical oriented  theory  of value.   Furthermore,  the  term  exhaustion is  defined 
as the passage of  things from the class of instruments, into  things which  are not instruments 
(Rae, 1834,p.93).   
  
It is clear that  up to now, Rae only talks  about instruments,  without any reference to the 
concept of good. For Rae goods are just a  special  category of instruments. Their 
distinguishing characteristic is that they can be exchanged. 
 
Some instruments are easily moved from place  to place, and, on this account,  they  are 
peculiar facilities, in exchanging  them  with  others. This seems to be the character 
distinguishing what  are called goods, or commodities, from other  instruments (Rae, 
1834,p.94). 
 
The common   measure of instruments  is labour.  As  Rae states: 
 
“...a day’s  labor as the  unit,  serving as the  base  of calculations,  concerning  the  
formation and exhaustion of   the  capacity  of  instruments (Rae, 1834,p.98). 
  
On  the  other hand,  Menger  uses satisfaction as  the key  concept with which different 
goods are compared.  in  particular, in the table that  he  constructs,  he  compares   the  
magnitudes of satisfaction  of different goods  by using a  scale  of  satisfactions  
(Menger,1950,p.127). 
 
Thus one  can  observe the point  of   departure  here   for  the  two authors.  Rae uses  labor 
as  the key  for comparing  instruments and  goods  while  Menger,   adopts the concept of 
satisfaction.  
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IV. Orders   of  Instruments and Goods 
 
The next concept  that Rae builds is the idea  of orders of  instruments. The  basic element 
which determines  the order  is  time. 
 
“ Every  instrument would find a place, in  some part of a  series, of   which  the  orders   
were determined by the  period  of  time  at which  instruments placed  in   them, issue, or  
would  issue,  if not before  exhausted,   in  events  equivalent  to  double  the  labor 
expended in forming them  (Rae, 1834,p.100).  
 
According to Rae,  theoretically  it  is  possible  to have an infinite  number   of orders since  
the  time  period determines  the  order. The  definition of  instruments  which belong to 
Order A  is   the   following: 
 
“They   in  one  year  issue in events  equivalent to double  the  labor  expended  on  their   
formation.” (Rae,1834,p.101)   
 
By the  same  reasoning,  the definition for Order B is in the same  lines the only difference  
being  that instead of  one year  we have two years. The  same holds for all other  Orders. Rae 
realizes that it is possible that many instruments might not be exhausted in an exact number 
of years nor that the capacities double the cost of formation. However, it would be possible to 
“reduce the instruments to some order that may be interposed between two proximate orders” 
(Rae, 1834,p.102). One can observe that Rae had a cardinal approach. 
   
 
Menger on the  other hand  defines  orders  purely  in  terms of  their proximity  to  the  
satisfaction of human  needs. More specifically, Menger, proceeds to separate goods  into  
four orders. The goods of  the  first-order  are those  that directly  satisfy human needs  and 
therefore acquire value.  The  second-order goods  are  those used   for  the production  of the 
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first-order goods  and  it   is only through this relationship that they   acquire  their  goods 
character (Menger, 1950,p.57). By the  same principle,   the third-order  goods are those that 
are used for the  production  of the second-order goods.   Finally, the  fourth order goods  are 
those that are used  for the  production  of the  third-order goods (Menger,1950,p.57). Thus  
one  can note  that only first -order goods  which  directly satisfy  needs  have direct value.    
Values  of higher  order goods are imputed. (Drakopoulos,1991). Furthermore, Menger’s 
schema is characterized by a  ordinal dimension.  
 
Given the above, Menger provides some examples of orders  of goods. According to Menger, 
bread, beverages, clothes are examples of first order goods since they directly satisfy human 
needs. The “labor service of a journeyman baker, and ordinary flour are examples of second 
order goods. Grain mills, wheat, rye, and the labour services applied to the production of 
flour, are examples of third order goods because they are used in the  production of  the  
second order goods. Finally, the fields for the cultivation  of wheat and rye, instruments and 
appliances necessary  for their  cultivation, and the specific labour services of  farmers are 
examples of fourth order goods (Menger,1950,p.57)  
 
Rae, based  on the definition of orders of instruments, gives  two general rules for the 
placement of instruments into orders.   The first rule is the  following: 
 
‘The  shorter the space of time between  the period of its formation, and  that of its  
exhaustion,  the  nearer will any instrument be placed  to the order  A, that is, towards  the 
more quickly  returning orders.” (Rae, 1834,p.108) 
 
The second rule relates the capacity and the cost of formation: 
 
“The greater the capacity, and the  less the cost of its formation, the nearer  will any  
instrument be to the order A;  the less the capacity,  the greater the cost of formation, the 
further will it be from A.”  (Rae, 1834,p.108). 
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The summary of  the above is that  the proximity of instruments to A is inversely as the cost 
and  the time, and directly as the capacity (Rae, 1834,p.108). As a final point here,  Rae 
accepts that it is possible to place an instrument further from order A : 
 
“The  procedure of  adding to the durability, by  adding equally to the expense of 
formation, will have greater effect in  placing an instrument further from  A, the more it is 
subjected to its operation” (Rae, 1834,p.111) 
 
Rae gives virtually no specific examples of instruments belonging to orders. However, it is 
not very difficult to place instruments to orders based on his general definition. It might be 
interesting to see where the examples that Menger supplies would be placed in Rae’s schema. 
Bread and Beverages are first order goods in Menger’s system but similarly, they are close to 
the A orders of instruments in Rae’s schema since the period between their formation and 
exhaustion is  short and also because the relatively low cost of formation. By the same 
reasoning, grain mills which is an example of third order good according to Menger, must be 
further away from the order A since the time period and the cost are higher than the previous 
two. The fields for the cultivation  of wheat and rye and the instruments  necessary  for their  
cultivation  which are all fourth order goods in Menger’s approach, are again even farther 
away from order A since their cost of formation and the time are even higher. Thus one can 
observe that there is a general agreement between the two authors concerning the placement 
of goods in lower and higher orders. This can be seen  as an additional indication that in the 
long-run classical and marginal value theories converge. 
   
However, it should be pointed out that the general implications of the  concept of order in 
Menger is radically different than those of Rae. In particular, in Menger’s system, capital 
goods are placed in the category of higher order goods since they are indirectly linked to 
human needs. This means that the idea of capital goods or means of production become a 
special category of incomplete consumable goods . The consequence of this is that it “extends 
the range of the principle of marginal utility over the whole area of production and 
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distribution” (Schumpeter, 1954, p.913). In general, cost phenomena are explained by the 
principle of marginal utility. 
 
On the other hand, Rae’s  approach enables him to set the basis of a theory of capital which is 
founded upon the concepts of time and cost of production. It is indicative, that subsequent 
historians of economic thought gave Rae the highest credit for his idea that the lengthening 
the process of production will in most cases increase the physical amount of the final product 
(e.g. Schumpeter,1954,p.469). 
 
It is possible to think of other similar examples in the history of economic thought where, an 
apparently similar  concept or an idea acquires different role and meaning in a new conceptual 
framework. The example of the concept of utility can be mentioned here. More specifically, it 
is not unknown that many classical economists such as Ricardo and Mill used the utility 
approach even in some connection to the theory of value. For instance, Ricardo thought that 
commodities posses utility and that utility is absolutely essential to exchangeable value 
(Ricardo,1817 [1987], p.5), Furthermore, Mill in the process of defining wealth explicitly 
accepts that utilities are embodied in material objects (Mill, 1848 [1909],p.46-48)  However, 
utility  was never employed to build an entirely subjective theory of value as was the case 
with the marginalist school. 
 
V. Concluding Comments 
 
The basic idea of this paper was to examine the concept of orders of instruments in the 
thought of Rae and the concept of orders of goods in  Menger. It was seen that both writers 
had an exceptionally similar definition of instruments and goods based on the idea of human 
needs. Subsequently, they both devised the concept of order which categorizes instruments 
and goods. For Rae, the basic criterion for the placement of instruments to orders is  time and 
the cost of formation. These ideas were the building blocks for a classical theory of capital, 
technology and accumulation. For Menger, the placement of goods in orders depends on how 
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directly satisfy human needs. Reflecting the marginalist perspective, Menger’s wider aim was 
the construction of a theory of consumer. The two criteria also indicate the difference between 
a classical  theory of value that Rae had and the subjective theory of value that was followed 
by Menger. In spite of this however,  the paper showed that there is a general agreement 
between the two authors concerning the placement of goods in lower and higher orders. 
Given the   different theories of value on which they are based, this point is of particular 
importance. It was then argued that the case of orders in Rae   and Menger, is a good example 
of  how the  same  idea  can lead  to  completely  different  approaches depending  on the 
conceptual  framework: Rae’s thought is closer to the traditional themes of the classicals 
while Menger ‘s ideas reflect the shift of emphasis to demand based theories. A similar 
example might be the concept of embodied utility which was employed by classical 
economists but it never led to a utility-based theory of value. Thus the findings of this paper  
might be seen as reinforcing the belief that the role of conceptual framework, or paradigm if 
one wants to follow a Kuhnian approach,  is important in understanding the development of 
economic thought.  
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